One skirmish in that war involved Fords successful eight year lobbying effort in opposition t Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301, case study solution rear end provisions of which might have forced Ford to redesign case study solution Pinto. But first some background:During case study answer early 60s, auto safety law became case study solution bte noire of American big commercial. The auto industry was case study solution last great unregulated business, and if it couldnt opposite case study answer tide of govt legislation, case study answer reasoning went, no you can still. People who know him cannot remember Henry Ford II taking a more robust stand than case study answer one he took towards case study solution regulation of safety design. He spent weeks in Washington calling on contributors of Congress, conserving press meetings and recruiting business cronies like W. B. Here is how it happened:There are several main thoughts in case study solution art of combating a central authority safety primary: a make your arguments in succession, so case study answer feds can be operating on disproving just one at a time; b claim that case study solution real problem is not X but Y we already saw one example of this in the challenge is not cars but people; c irrespective of how ridiculous each argument is, accompany it with hundreds of pages of highly technical assertions it’s going to take case study answer govt months or, ideally, years to check. Fords large and active Washington office brought these options to new heights and became case study answer envy of case study solution lobbyists trade. The Ford people began arguing towards Standard 301 way back in 1968 with a strong attack of technique b. Fire, they said, was not case study answer real challenge. Sure, cars catch fire and people burn every so often. But statistically auto fires are such a minor challenge that NHTSA should really concern itself with other things.